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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DOUBLE CELLING REQUIRES EXAMINATION OF TOTAL
PRISON CONDITIONS. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
Inmates at three Maryland prisons challenged the constitutionality
of double ceiling as cruel and unusual punishment.' The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland examined the overall condi-
tions at the three institutions, found they imposed unconstitutional con-
ditions of confinement and ordered the elimination of double celling.
2
In a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding, but granted Mary-
land an extension of time for compliance at those prisons until the con-
struction of a new prison, the Jessup Annex, was completed.3 Shortly
thereafter, Maryland ended double ceiling at the three prisons by initi-
ating advanced release parole programs.
Before the Jessup Annex was completed, however, Maryland ex-
perienced an unexpected increase in its prison population.5 To ac-
comodate this increase, Maryland proposed limited double ceiling at
the Jessup Annex.6 The district court rejected Maryland's plan, declar-
ing double ceiling to be unconstitutional per se.7 The court of appeals,
relying on a recent United States Supreme Court decision,' vacated the
district court order, ruling that the constitutionality of double ceiling
requires an examination of total prison conditions.9
1. The term "double ceiling" refers to the practice of housing two inmates in a prison
cell originally designed for housing one inmate. Three suits evolved from these
complaints: Washington v. Keller, 479 F. Supp. 569 (D. Md. 1979) (challenging
conditions at the Maryland Correctional Institution); Nelson v. Collins, 455 F.
Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978) (challenging conditions at the Maryland Penitentiary
and the Maryland Reception, Diagnostic and Classification Center); and Johnson
v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978) (challenging conditions at the Mary-
land House of Corrections).
2. Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727, 734, 736 (D. Md. 1978); Johnson v. Levine,
450 F. Supp. 648, 656, 661 (D. Md. 1978). In Washington v. Keller, 479 F. Supp.
569 (D. Md. 1979) the State and the prisoners entered into a consent decree to
eliminate double ceiling at the Maryland Correctional Institution.
3. Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
4. Brief for Appellants at 7-9, Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
5. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
6. Id at 423. Maryland proposed double ceiling inmates in 224 of the 512 cells for a
period not to exceed 120 days, with the State pledging its best efforts to limit that
period to sixty days. The inmates to be double celled would be: returned escap-
ees awaiting reassignment, inmates charged with parole violations, and those in-
mates with Mutual Agreed Parole Contracts returning to minimum security
institutions. The State also offered to double cell those inmates who volunteered
for a period of time not to exceed one year. Brief for Appellants at 2, Nelson v.
Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
7. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (the district court
order was unpublished).
8. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 23-
29.
9. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Nelson also
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The gravamen of challenges to overcrowded conditions of confine-
ment is the eighth amendment provision which forbids cruel and unu-
sual punishment.' ° While the Supreme Court has held that prison
conditions must not inflict wanton and unnecessary pain l and must
conform to "contemporary standards of decency,"' 2 it has not defined
what constitutes the latter term. The Court, however, has held that
since prisoners are dependent upon prison officials for medical treat-
ment, denial of such treatment inflicts wanton and unnecessary pain
and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.'3 Length of confine-
ment is also a factor the Court has considered, since conditions which
exist for a short period of time are less likely to amount to cruel and
unusual punishment."
Because of the narrow scope of these Supreme Court decisions, the
burden of developing constitutional standards for inmate confinement
devolved upon the lower federal courts. In an attempt to meet this
burden, the courts developed a "totality of conditions" test requiring an
examination of the challenged conditions and a determination as to
whether their cumulative impact on prison life constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. 5 Judges, recognizing their lack of expertise in
this area, frequently rely upon standards established by health associa-
tions and penologists in reaching a determination.' 6 Intolerable living
conditions caused by insufficient cell space, increased potential for vio-
lence, exposure to health hazards and denial of adequate medical care
have been held to be cruel and unusual punishment by lower federal
courts, resulting in orders to cease double ceiling.'7 These decisions
examined the constitutionality of double bunking inmates in the dormitories at
the Maryland House of Corrections and an appeal of a district court order trans-
ferrin& prisoners to federal prisons. This casenote focuses solely on the constitu-
tionality of double ceiling at the Jessup Annex.
10. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Confinement in
prison is a form of punishment subject to eighth amendment scrutiny. Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
11. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion). Inflictions of wanton
and unnecessary pain would be those actions "totally without penological justifi-
cations." Id at 183.
12. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
13. Id
14. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978). "A filthy, overcrowded cell and a
diet of 'grue' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or
months." Id
15. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 401 (10th Cir. 1977); Laaman v.
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 317, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977). For a list of tests used
when conditions other than overcrowding are challenged, see Fair, The Lower
Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J.
CRIM. LAW 119, 124-28 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1977).
17. Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (D. Or. 1980); Anderson v. Redman,
429 F. Supp. 1105, 1119 (D. Del. 1977); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20,
33 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
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Nelson v. Collins
demonstrate that "contemporary standards of decency" require states
to provide inmates with the basic necessities of life, such as food, cloth-
ing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.' 8
The Fourth Circuit applied an identical standard as other lower
federal courts in determining whether double ceiling of inmates was
constitutionally permissible. When inmates at a modern South Caro-
lina facility challenged the practice of double ceiling, claiming that the
housing conditions alone were cruel and unusual, the Fourth Circuit
applied the totality of conditions test and dismissed the prisoners'
claims. 19 Significantly, the inmates had not alleged a lack of adequate
food, clothing, medical attention, or unsanitary conditions.2 ° However,
when the effect of double ceiling, combined with other deprivations
caused by overcrowding, resulted in serious deficiencies in Maryland's
prison system the court of appeals affirmed a finding of unconstitu-
tional conditions of confinement.2'
As the practice of double ceiling became widespread and the
number of state prison systems ordered to reduce overcrowding in-
creased,22 it became apparent that the federal courts needed an eighth
amendment interpretation of double ceiling by the Supreme Court. In
Rhodes v. Chapman, 23 the Court addressed the issue of double ceiling
in a prison housing a population in excess of its stated capacity, but
otherwise providing the basic necessities of life.24 The conditions at the
newly built Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) had been
found unconstitutional by a federal district court because of the perma-
nent double ceiling of long-term inmates in cells providing less space
than that recommended by penologists.25 Applying the totality of con-
18. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978).
19. Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1977). When triple ceiling at the same prison
was challenged as cruel and unusual punishment one year earlier, the court of
appeals balanced the "legitimate rights of the prisoner with the necessary concern
and responsibility of the prison authorities for security and order." Crowe v.
Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 741 (4th Cir. 1976).
20. Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 674 (4th Cir. 1977).
21. Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The court listed the
deprivations caused by the overcrowding: limited recreation, instruction, and re-
habilitation, poor maintenance of sanitation, high level of violence and psycho-
logical injury, and strain on medical facilities. Id at 1380.
22. A list of state prisons and state prison systems under court order may be found in
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353-54 n.l (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
23. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
24. The prison examined by the Court had gymnasiums, various types of workshops,
school rooms, day rooms, two chapels, a hospital ward, commissary, barber shop,
library, a recreational field, visitation area and garden. Id at 340-41.
25. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977). In an unpublished
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 624
F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), interpreting the district court opinion as holding that
double celling was unconstitutional under the conditions at the SOCF but not
unconstitutional per se. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344 (1981).
19821
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ditions test,2 6 the Court found no evidence that double ceiling at
SOCF, in and of itself, inflicted wanton and unnecessary pain. Double
ceiling had not deprived inmates of food, medical care or sanitation
nor had it increased inmate violence.27 Because "the Constitution does
not mandate comfortable prisons," the Court viewed double ceiling as
a permissible consequence of incarceration.28 Noting the lower court's
reliance upon testimony by penologists, the Rhodes Court conceded
that such opinions may be useful, but stated that the responsibility for
establishing the "constitutional minima" for inmate confinement rests
with the courts and not the experts.29
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was
presented with an opportunity to apply the precepts of Rhodes when
Maryland's proposal to initiate double ceiling at the Jessup Annex was
rejected by the district court.3" The court of appeals, in Nelson v. Col-
lins, 31 compared the inmates' complaints in Rhodes to those of Mary-
land inmates and opined that the facts and lower court decisions in the
two cases were "almost a carbon copy" of each other.32 Maryland, like
Ohio, was beset by an unexpected rise in its rison population and was
forced to double the housing of its inmates.3 3 The Jessup Annex and
the SOCF are both modem penal institutions with comparable cell
sizes and adequate provisions for food, dental care, psychiatric services
and recreational opportunities.34 The Nelson court rejected the district
court's simplistic reasoning that "two prisoners should not be confined
to a single cell" and that double ceiling was constitutionally impermis-
sible.35 Because the conditions at the Jessup Annex equaled those
found constitutional in Rhodes, the district court order preventing
26. The Court stated "[Prison]. . . [c]onditions alone or in combination, may deprive
inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan reviewed the tests developed by the lower federal courts and
concluded that the majority adopted the totality of conditions test as the proper
degree of scrutiny for eighth amendment challenges to inmate confinement. Id at
362-63 & n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115,
1139-40 n.98 (5th Cir. 1982).
27. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1981).
28. Id at 349.
29. Id at 348-49 n. 13. But see id at 363 & n. 11 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Justice
Brennan does not read the majority's opinion as rejecting the use of experts.
Brennan cites the Court's acknowledgment "that expert opinion may be 'helpful
and relevant' in some circumstances").
30. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
31. 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
32. Id at 427.
33. Id
34. Id at 429. In contrast to the lower court in Rhodes, the Nelson court did not make
an extensive finding as to the other facilities available to Jessup Annex inmates.
See supra note 24.
35. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 428 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The district court
had stated, "Double ceiling is not an acceptable solution to the problem of over-
crowding in Maryland prisons." Id
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double ceiling at the new Maryland prison was vacated by the court of
appeals. 6
The Nelson decision manifests the potential problem of hasty ap-
plications of the views expressed by the Supreme Court in Rhodes v.
Chapman. 31 Rhodes merely holds that double celling alone can never
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes is a narrow decision,
limited to the impact of double ceiling on the inmates of a specific facil-
ity, the SOCF. Additionally, it should be noted that the SOCF was a
fully operating institution when examined by the Supreme Court, while
the Jessup Annex was still under construction when Nelson was before
the Fourth Circuit.3 The Supreme Court's adoption of the totality of
conditions test indicates that federal courts must investigate the overall
conditions at a challenged prison before determining whether double
celing results in unconstitutional confinement. The Nelson court did
not make such an investigation to determine the effect of double celling
at the new prison. Instead, generalized comparisons were made in an
attempt to show that the facilities and programs at the SOCF were fac-
tually similar to those at the Jessup Annex. In fact, the Nelson decision
appears to have been motivated solely by the Fourth Circuit's desire to
vacate the district court ruling that double celling is unconstitutional
per se. Considering the years of litigation over the conditions in Mary-
land prisons, the concurring and dissenting judges rightly assert that
this case should have been remanded for fuller consideration of the
effect of double ceiling on the inmates at the Jessup Annex.
39
Double ceiling is a natural focal point of attack because it is imme-
diately apparent, whereas the effect of reducing basic necessities other
than adequate living space is not. Cells, however, are more easily
equipped to accomodate an additional body than are prison nutri-
tional, medical, recreational, vocational and rehabilitative services.
But, as the inmate population increases, the quality of these services
inevitably diminishes. Rhodes indicates only that double celling, in
and of itself, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Future
challenges to double ceiling, therefore, must demonstrate the deleteri-
ous impact overcrowding has on an entire facility. Courts must con-
tinue to insure that inmates are provided the basic necessities of life,
despite the double celled conditions. This determination can best be
made by a judge who has personally witnessed the challenged condi-
tions. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has cautioned that the
"constitutional minima" is to be determined by the courts, judges
should remain receptive to the opinions of penologists when determin-
36. Id at 429.
37. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
38. Brief for Appellants at 5, Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981) (en
bane).
39. Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 429-31 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (Winter, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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ing whether overcrowded conditions constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.'0
The overwhelming caseload of prisoner related cases4' attests that
something is wrong with the methods employed in prisons.42 Prison
officials are faced with the dilemma of dealing with burgeoning popu-
lations in facilities incapable of handling the increase. State legisla-
tures are reluctant to spend tax dollars for construction of new prisons.
Therefore, courts hear overcrowding cases with the knowledge that a
state may have no place to transfer inmates should the conditions be
found unconstitutional. This knowledge, however, must not deter
courts from protecting the constitutional rights of inmates and assuring
that their conditions of confinement meet contemporary standards of
decency.
Harry Levy
40. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Approximately one out of every six cases filed in the federal courts of appeals are
prisoner related cases. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, MAN-
AGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS 12 (1980) (generally available
in law libraries).
42. "We simply do not know what to do with the persons who are convicted of crimes
nor do we appear to know why we are doing whatever we do." Barnes v. Govern-
ment of Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1221 (D.V.I. 1976).
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